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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1967, Congress passed the Public Broadcasting Act to facili-
tate the growth of public television. The Act provided for the crea-
tion of a nonprofit company, the Corporation for Public Broadcast-
ing, to disburse federal funds to individual public noncommercial
stations.1 Section 399 of the Act provided that no public television
station may engage in editorializing, or support or oppose any can-
didate for political office.2 The League of Women Voters of Califor-
nia, Pacifica Foundation, and Congressman Henry Waxman chal-
lenged the provision on the grounds that it violated the first
amendment right to freedom of speech, and that it denied equal
protection under the due process clause of the fifth amendment.s
The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment several months
after filing the complaint, and the United States Department of
Justice chose not to defend the constitutionality of section 399.4
Instead, the Department of Justice presented the matter to Con-
1. Grabow, The Public Broadcasting Act: The Licensee Editorializing Ban and the
First Amendment, 13 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 541, 545-46 (1980).
2. 47 U.S.C. § 399 (1982).
3. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 104 S. Ct. 3106, 3113 (1984). The California
League of Women Voters challenged § 399 because it wished to enlist the "editorial sup-
port" of educational stations. Pacifica Foundation is a nonprofit corporation operating five
educational radio stations that wished to state their views in editorial form and to label
them as opinions of the management. Henry Waxman, a regular listener and viewer of edu-
cational stations, wished to hear their editorial opinions. Id. at 3112 n.6.
4. Id. at 3113. Justice Brennan noted that then Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti
said the Department of Justice had already concluded that § 399 violated the first amend-
ment, and that no reasonable argument could be made in its defense. See id. at 3113 n.8.
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
gress, which considered various forms of action.' The Senate Legal
Counsel moved for leave to appear as amicus curiae, and the Sen-
ate noticed a motion to dismiss on the alternative ground that the
matter was not ripe for adjudication. The plaintiffs moved to disal-
low the motion to dismiss. The district court granted the Senate's
motion for leave to appear as amicus curiae, denied the plaintiffs'
motion to disallow filing of the motion to dismiss, and granted the
Senate's motion to dismiss.7
The Department of Justice then further complicated matters
by choosing to defend the constitutionality of section 399 on the
plaintiffs' appeal of dismissal.8 On remand, the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Central District of California vacated the order
of dismissal.9 Before the court heard the original summary judg-
ment motion, however, Congress amended section 399.10 Instead of
applying to all public broadcasters, the amended Act barred only
those public broadcasters receiving funds from the Corporation for
Public Broadcasting. Congress, however, continued to bar all pub-
lic stations from supporting or opposing political candidates.
The plaintiffs amended their complaint to concentrate on the
editorial ban by dropping the challenge to the portion of section
399 prohibiting involvement with political campaigns. The Califor-
nia district court then granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary
judgment, declaring section 399 to be unconstitutional." On direct
appeal, the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed, holding
that section 399's ban on editorializing violates the first
amendment. 2
II. HISTORICAL CONTEXT LEADING TO FCC v. League of Women
Voters
A. Legislative Developments
The federal government's involvement with educational
5. League of Women Voters v. FCC, 547 F. Supp. 379, 381 (C.D. Cal. 1982), aff'd, 104 S.
Ct. 3106 (1984).
6. Id.
7. League of Women Voters v. FCC, 489 F. Supp. 517 (C.D. Cal. 1980).
8. League of Women Voters, 547 F. Supp. at 381.
9. Id. at 382.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 387. The court held that § 399 violated the first amendment insofar as it
prohibited funded, noncommercial broadcasters from editorializing. The evidence before the
court was insufficient to grant summary judgment under the equal protection guarantee of
the fifth amendment. Id. at 388.
12. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 104 S. Ct. 3106 (1984).
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broadcasting dates back to 1939, when the Federal Communica-
tions Commission (FCC) first reserved certain radio frequencies for
educational use.13 The first financial assistance came from the
Educational Television Facilities Act of 1962.1' This Act gave the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare the power to dis-
tribute $32 million in matching grants over a five-year period for
the construction of educational television facilities.1
5
In 1967, the Carnegie Commission printed the first major re-
port concerning the status of public television.'" The report em-
phasized a chronic lack of funds and recommended the creation of
a nonprofit corporation to disburse funds to qualifying noncom-
mercial educational broadcasting stations.
7
The report met with tremendous government approval. Subse-
quently, Congress drafted and passed the Public Broadcasting Act
of 1967 pursuant to the Carnegie Commission's recommenda-
tions.'8 The Act created the Corporation for Public Broadcasting
to receive periodic congressional appropriations from the govern-
ment and to disburse them to qualifying public stations.' e The
Carnegie Commission's report suggested this procedure to avoid
conflicts of interest between the government and public broadcast-
ers.20 Congress went one step further by adding section 399 to the
Act, which prohibits any broadcaster receiving federal funds from
editorializing or contributing to political campaigns.2 1 Section 399
13. Grabow, supra note 1, at 543.
14. Pub. L. No. 87-447, 76 Stat. 64 (1967).
15. Grabow, supra note 1, at 544.
16. CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON EDUCATIONAL TELEVISION, PUBLIC TELEVISION: A PROGRAM
FOR ACTION (1967).
17. Grabow, supra note 1, at 545.
18. Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, 47 U.S.C. §§ 390-399 (1982).
19. The President appoints a fifteen-member Board of Directors, subject to Senate ap-
proval, to run the corporation. Only eight of the members may belong to the same political
party. In addition, the Act expressly prohibits the corporation from owning or operating any
stations or networks of its own, and it may not contribute to any political campaigns.
Grabow, supra note 1, at 546.
Some critics of the Act claim that Congress's policy of making sporadic appropriations
lacks efficiency, and that Congress therefore should revise its policy. Others consider the
periodic disbursement program to operate as a check on the government's ability to frighten
public stations into saying only what Congress finds favorable. Compare Grabow, supra note
1, at 545 with FCC v. League of Women Voters, 104 S. Ct. 3106, 3123 (1984). Although
Justice Brennan implies in League of Women Voters that sporadic funding acts as a check
against congressional strong-arm tactics, commentator Grabow considers such a system a
"plague" on the various public broadcasting agencies.
20. Grabow, supra note 1, at 545, 546; see also Canby, The First Amendment and the
State as Editor: Implications for Public Broadcasting, 52 TEx. L. REV. 1123, 1152 (1974).
21. 47 U.S.C. § 399 (1982) codified § 399 of Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 730 as follows:
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is the only major ban that Congress has placed on owners and op-
erators of public broadcasting facilities.2 2
The House of Representatives added section 399 to the Public
Broadcasting Act admittedly out of an "abundance of caution. "23
Many congressmen felt that, without strict precautions, the sta-
tions receiving federal funding would become virtual propaganda
agencies for political parties or would present only one point of
view.24 A review of the House hearings, however, suggests that sec-
tion 399 was a compromise to swing the votes of congressmen who
feared that broadcasters might aim derogatory editorials at them
in their home districts.25
Regardless of the exact intent of the House members, the final
draft included section 399. The FCC since has interpreted it to
preclude only editorials conveying the opinions of the broadcast
licensees, their management, or individuals speaking on their be-
half.26 Thus, any individual not connected with the station and any
station employee who states an opinion as his own may editorialize
on any subject.
2 7
"No noncommercial educational broadcasting station which receives a grant from the Cor-
poration under subpart C of this part may engage in editorializing. No noncommercial edu-
cational broadcasting station may support or oppose any candidate for political office."
22. A second restriction was added to the Act in 1973 requiring noncommercial licen-
sees to retain audio recordings of all controversial programs for 90 days and to make them
available to anyone wishing to view them. Act of Aug. 6, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-84, § 2, 87
Stat. 219 (1973). The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
declared this second restriction unconstitutional in Community-Service Broadcasting v.
FCC, 593 F.2d 1102 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Chief Justice Skelly Wright found that "[nione of the
purposes put forward to support the recording requirement adequately justifies the distinc-
tion drawn between commercial and noncommercial broadcasters." Id. at 1103-04. As a re-
sult, the court held that the statute and regulations were unconstitutional. Id. at 1123. See
generally Grabow, supra note 1, at 547 (discussing Community-Service Broadcasting v.
FCC).
23. The Public Broadcasting Act began as a Johnson Administration proposal, then
went through a Senate revision before reaching the House of Representatives, where § 399
was added. H.R. REP. No. 572, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1967), reprinted in FCC v. League of
Women Voters, 104 S. Ct. 3106, 3121 (1984).
24. The fear of creating propaganda machines was the strongest argument in support of
§ 399 from its inception until the Supreme Court struck it down. See Grabow, supra note 1,
at 548.
25. "The House floor debate reveals that the reason for the prohibition may have been
less a congressional concern over government propagandizing and more a fear of the power
of television on the personal political survival of many congressmen." Grabow, supra note 1,
at 548. Congressman Joelson, referring to the decision in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964), stated that public officials such as himself were "sitting ducks." Grabow,
supra note 1, at 548 n.59 and accompanying text.
26. League of Women Voters v. FCC, 547 F. Supp. 379, 383 (C.D. Cal. 1982), aff'd, 104
S. Ct. 3106 (1984).
27. Id. at 383.
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B. Case History of Speech Restrictions in Broadcasting
For almost two decades, both commercial and noncommercial
broadcasters have dealt with the issues that arise when they pub-
licly state their own opinions. 28 The Court's decision in Red Lion
Broadcasting v. FCC29 highlights some of these issues. Red Lion
Broadcasting Company was licensed to operate Pennsylvania radio
station WGCB. In November 1964, the station aired a fifteen-min-
ute broadcast, during which Reverend Billy James Hargis made
several charges concerning author Fred J. Cook and his book,
Goldwater-Extremist on the Right.30 According to Hargis, the
newspaper for which Cook worked fired Cook because he made
false charges against a city official. Hargis also charged that Cook
worked for a "Communist-affiliated publication," that he had at-
tacked J. Edgar Hoover and the CIA, and that he had written his
book "to smear and destroy Barry Goldwater. '31 Cook heard the
broadcast and demanded free reply time, alleging that Hargis had
personally attacked him.2 The station refused to grant him reply
time. After Cook and Red Lion informed the FCC, it determined
that Hargis had made a personal attack on Cook's character, and
that Red Lion had not complied with the requirements of the fair-
ness doctrine as expressed in Times-Mirror Broadcasting Co.38
Under the fairness doctrine, the station is obligated to send a tape,
transcript, or summary of the broadcast to the person being at-
tacked and offer him reply time, whether or not the person could
pay the station for the air time. 4 The Court of Appeals of the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit upheld the doctrine on review, finding it
to be constitutional and otherwise proper.3 Courts as well as
broadcasters consider the fairness doctrine an equitable way to
deal with editorial opinions that station managements espouse.36
A related problem arises when organizations compete for lim-
ited broadcast time to air editorial advertisements on controversial
issues. In CBS v. Democratic National Committee,7 the Business
28. See generally Canby, supra note 20, at 1123-65 (an overview of freedom of speech
violations in various forms of the media).
29. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
30. Id. at 371.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 371-72.
33. 1 RAD. REG. (P&F) 10:315(G) (1962).
34. Id.
35. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 381 F.2d 908, 930 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
36. See, e.g., Canby, supra note 20, at 1160-61.
37. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
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Executives for Vietnam Peace (BEM) asked to buy time on radio
station WTOP in Washington, D.C., to air a series of one-minute
spot announcements expressing their views on the Vietnam con-
flict. The station refused to sell them any air time, saying that it
followed the policy of many fellow broadcasters.38 Those adhering,
to this policy argued that because they presented "full and fair"
coverage of controversial issues, they could refuse to sell air time
for editorial use by private groups or individuals.3 9 When BEM
filed a formal complaint with the FCC, WTOP presented evidence
that it already had allowed critics of the Vietnam policy to air
their views, and thus it was not required to sell time to BEM."°
Four months later, the Democratic National Committee filed a
request with the FCC for a declaratory ruling claiming that it in-
tended to purchase time on various radio and television stations to
present the committee's views and to solicit funds.4' The commit-
tee stated that although it did not object to the policies of any
particular broadcaster, it feared the committee would encounter
"considerable difficulty," if not complete frustration, if the FCC
did not make the requested ruling.
2
The FCC rejected the demands of both groups, stating that
"responsible" individuals and organizations did not have a right to
purchase air time under the fairness doctrine.' 3 The court of ap-
peals reversed the FCC's decision on the ground that such a ban
on paid public announcements is in violation of the first amend-
ment." The Supreme Court of the United States ultimately held
in favor of the stations, ruling that they retained the right to ac-
cept only those paid editorial advertisements they chose.'5
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-




42. Id. at 99.
43. Id.
44. Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642, 643 (D.C. Cir.
1971).
45. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 123 (1973).
The Commission was justified in concluding that the public interest in providing
access to the marketplace of "ideas and experiences" would scarcely be served
by a system so heavily weighted in favor of the financially affluent, or those with
access to wealth. . . . [T]he views of the affluent could well prevail over those of
others, since they would have it within their power to purchase time more
frequently.
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bia Circuit analyzed the regulation of noncommercial broadcasters
in Accuracy in Media, Inc. v. FCC.46 Accuracy in Media, Inc.
(AIM), an organization concerned with the content of public
broadcast material, filed complaints against the Public Broadcast-
ing Service (PBS) concerning two programs that PBS distributed
to its affiliate stations. The organization alleged that the programs,
which dealt with sex education and the American criminal justice
system, did not adequately present all sides of the issues.47 AIM
asserted the fairness doctrine and section 396(g)(1)(A) of the Pub-
lic Broadcasting Act as the legal bases of its complaint.'8 Section
396(g)(1)(A) qualifies the Corporation for Public Broadcasting's
authority to fund programming activities of local, noncommercial
broadcasting licensees by directing that programs be "made availa-
ble .. .with strict adherence to objectivity and balance."' 9
PBS is a nonprofit corporation that distributes national pro-
gramming to educational broadcast licensees by common carrier.
The Corporation for Public Broadcasting funds both PBS itself
and a significant number of the programs that PBS distributes.5 0
AIM argued that because the corporation funded the PBS pro-
grams in question, the programs must adhere to the "objectivity
and balance" requirement of section 396(g)(1)(A). 5" The court held
that the FCC has authority to enforce the fairness doctrine against
noncommercial licensees, which it chose not to do in this case, but
that the FCC did not have authority to enforce the mandate of
section 396(g)(1)(A) against the Corporation for Public
Broadcasting.
52
In 1979, the Carter-Mondale Presidential Committee filed a
complaint with the FCC when all three major networks refused to
sell them a thirty-minute block of prime time during the first week
of December 1979.53 The complaint charged that the networks vio-
lated the "reasonable access" provision of section 312(a)(7).5 , The
FCC ruled that the networks violated section 312(a)(7), concluding
that the networks had not satisfied the FCC's standards of reason-
46. 521 F.2d 288 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
47. Id. at 290.
48. Id.
49. Id.; see 47 U.S.C. § 396(g)(1)(A) (1982).
50. Accuracy in Media, Inc., 521 F.2d at 292.
51. Id. at 290.
52. Id. at 292-96.
53. CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 371 (1981).
54. Id. at 373-74.
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ableness in refusing to sell the time." The court of appeals af-
firmed the FCC's order on the ground that the statute "created a
new, affirmative right of access to the broadcast media for individ-
ual candidates for federal elective office." '
CBS and NBC argued that section 312(a)(7) merely codified
policies that the FCC developed under the public interest stan-
dard, and that it did not impose new obligations on broadcasters.
57
The public interest requirement called for broadcasters to devote
some air time to political issues. This requirement, however,
neither bestowed upon an individual candidate a right of access,
nor distinguished between federal, state, and local elections. 8 The
networks also asserted that section 312(a)(7), as the FCC imple-
mented it, violated the first amendment rights of broadcasters be-
cause it "unduly circumscrib[ed] their editorial discretion." 59 The
Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the decision of the
court of appeals, holding that section 312(a)(7) does grant individ-
ual candidates a special right of access.6 0 The Court found that the
FCC's standards are not arbitrary and capricious, and that the
FCC's action represents "a reasoned attempt to effectuate the stat-
ute's access requirement, giving broadcasters room to exercise their
discretion but demanding that they act in good faith.""1 They fur-
ther held that section 312(a)(7) does not violate the "First Amend-
ment rights of broadcasters by unduly circumscribing their [indi-
vidual] discretion" but rather balances the first amendment rights
of the candidates, the broadcasters, and the public.6 2
C. FCC v. League of Women Voters: Combining the Issues
The Supreme Court made several observations while resolving
the section 399 constitutionality question in League of Women
Voters. First, because Congress directly controls the purse strings
of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, it is possible that sta-
tions could become the puppets of politicians. Second, the fairness
doctrine, which commercial broadcasters who editorialize use so ef-
55. Id. at 374.
56. Id. at 375.
57. Id. at 376-77.
58. Id. at 378-79.
59. Id. at 394.
60. Id. at 379.
61. Id. at 390.
62. Id. at 394. "It is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political,
esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here." Id. at 395 (quoting
Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969)).
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fectively, could provide sufficient protection from such governmen-
tal bullying. Finally, the public's right to hear all sides of contro-
versial issues plays an important role as well.
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, first tackled the is-
sues before him by separating the two sentences of section 399,
and stating that the Court would not determine the constitutional-
ity of the second sentence. Instead, the Court would sever the Act
into two distinct parts: one dealing with editorializing and one with
supporting or opposing political candidates. 3
In addressing the main issue, the Court found that section 399
did not provide a viable solution to the government control
problems."' The Court reasoned that editorializing by local non-
commercial stations would vary greatly in content.6 5 If one such
station in the Midwest voiced a concept that Congress did not like,
it seems highly unlikely that Congress would decide to cut off all
funds to public broadcasters.66 Use of the fairness doctrine could
produce the same results in noncommercial television as it has for
years in the commercial sector, requiring stations to provide equal
time for opposing viewpoints.6 7 These reasons caused the Court to
hold that section 399 served no substantial interest of Congress,
and that it placed too great a restriction on first amendment
rights.68
III. ANALYSIS OF THE League of Women Voters DECISION
A. Legislative Intent
When Congress enacted the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967,
it sought to use its power under the commerce clause to regulate a
scarce national resource, available public broadcasting time .6  In
fact, the "scarcity doctrine" had existed for some time in the realm
of broadcasting. ° In League of Women Voters, however, the Court
63. League of Women Voters, 104 S. Ct. at 3113 n.9.
64. Id. at 3121-25.
65. Id. at 3123.
66. Cf. Grabow, supra note 1, at 558-61 (Because federal funding for public broadcast-
ing is minimal, it does not pose a danger of government control.).
67. Cf. Canby, supra note 28, at 1150 (private broadcasters must devote part of their
broadcast time to public issues).
68. League of Women Voters, 104 S. Ct. at 3118. The Supreme Court abandoned the
district court's "compelling governmental interest" standard and adopted this "substantial
interest" standard. See infra text accompanying notes 73-75.
69. League of Women Voters, 104 S. Ct. at 3115.
70. The Supreme Court first used the "scarcity doctrine" in 1943 in National Broad-
casting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 210-14 (1943). The doctrine "is based on the
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suggested that this doctrine has probably become obsolete with the
advent of dozens of cable television stations. 1 Although this doc-
trine may no longer apply, Congress has retained the power to bal-
ance the presentation of information on controversial issues of
public interest and importance, 2 within the confines of the first
amendment. For commercial broadcasters, the fairness doctrine
provided a workable method of balancing the public interest in ob-
jectivity and the broadcaster's discretion when presenting editori-
als. Public broadcasting, however, proved a more complex problem.
In the commercial sector, economic factors provide a set of checks
and balances that broadcasters must adhere to if they wish to re-
main in business. They rely exclusively on the income received
from advertisers, who hold a wide variety of views. Public broad-
casters, at least those affected by section 399, receive funding from
at least two sources-private sector organizations or individuals
and the federal government via the Corporation for Public Broad-
casting. Thus, the theoretical economic balance cannot be struck
because the federal government should not, under the first amend-
ment, influence broadcasters' material.
The district court, taking these arguments into consideration,
found that it should look for a "compelling" governmental interest
when reviewing the contents of section 399.7s Justice Brennan
stated that although this appears correct at first blush, the broad-
casting industry presents unusual and specific problems. The gov-
ernment argued that the problem of "spectrum scarcity" provides
the necessity for regulating all broadcasters' power to editorialize. 74
In addition, noncommercial broadcasting provides the additional
factor of being the only medium that has the "programming excel-
lence and diversity that the commercial sector could not or would
not produce. '7 5 The Court gave little credence to the spectrum
scarcity doctrine, concentrating instead on its past decisions in all
areas of media regulation.
Citing Mills v. Alabama76 and Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
premise that the electromagnetic broadcast spectrum is a valuable public resource in scarce
supply." Grabow, supra note 1, at 552. The government's failure to regulate would suppos-
edly cause signal interference. Id. at 553.
71. League of Women Voters, 104 S. Ct. at 3115.
72. Id. at 3116.
73. Id. at 3115.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. 384 U.S. 214 (1966).
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Tornillo," the Court stated that if a ban on editorializing were ap-
plied to print media, it would clearly violate the first amendment,
and that the Court would immediately declare such a provision un-
constitutional.78 The broadcast medium does not always present
the same issues as the print media, however, and the Court has on
previous occasions recognized that "'differences in the characteris-
tics of new media justify. differences in the first amendment stan-
dards applied to them.' -7 Thus, Congress, through the commerce
clause, has the power to "seek to assure that the public receives
through this medium a balanced presentation of information on is-
sues of public importance that otherwise might not be addressed if
control of the medium were left entirely in the hands of those who
own and operate broadcasting stations."80
On the other hand, the journalistic freedom given to broad-
casters should stay as broad as possible. Decisions such as CBS v.
FCC 81 are indicative of the Court's attempts to maintain the
broad scope of broadcasters' first amendment rights. In that case,
the Court held that broadcasters are entitled to exercise "the wid-
est journalistic freedom consistent with their public [duties].""2
Justice Brennan concluded from these prior decisions that
Congress has a substantial but not compelling interest in the regu-
lation of public broadcasters.8 3 Even using the substantial interest
test, the Court found that the editorial ban surpassed the limits of
Congress's power, and declared it unconstitutional. 4
B. The Majority's Compromise
The Court, in its discussion, compromised both conclusions
and, in some instances, precedent, to unite the requisite five judges
needed for a majority. First, Justice Brennan stated that the sup-
pression of speech was content-based, that the ban on editorializ-
77. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
78. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 104 S. Ct. 3106, 3115-16 (1984).
79. Id. at 3116 (quoting Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969)).
80. Id.
81. 453 U.S. 367 (1981).
82. Id. at 395; see also CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 124-27 (1973).
83. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 104 S. Ct. 3106, 3117-18 (1984); see FCC v.
Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 377
(1968).
84. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 104 S. Ct. 3106, 3129 (1984). "In sum, § 399's
broad ban on all editorializing by every station that receives CPB funds far exceeds what is
necessary to protect against the risk of governmental interference or to prevent the public
from assuming that editorials by public broadcasting stations represent the official view of
government." Id. at 3126.
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ing was based on the subject matter of the suppressed speech, and
that such a ban denied first amendment rights. 5 Justice Brennan
cited Consolidated Edison v. Public Service Commission86 for the
proposition that such a ban demonstrates the clearest form of un-
constitutional censorship.8 7 In Consolidated, a public utility en-
closed in its monthly electric bills a pamphlet entitled "Indepen-
dence is Still a Goal, and Nuclear Power is Needed to Win the
Battle." '88 Two months later, the Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil (NRDC) requested that Consolidated include a rebuttal in its
next bill mailing. When Consolidated refused, NRDC asked the
Public Service Commission of New York to intervene. The Com-
mission denied NRDC's request, but subsequently forbade the
utilities in New York from discussing political matters in bill in-
serts.89 The Supreme Court declared the Commission's move un-
constitutional. As Justice Stevens pointed out in his League of
Women Voters dissent, however, the statement that Justice Bren-
nan quoted was from Stevens's concurrence in Consolidated, and it
referred to suppression of statements of a particular point of view,
whereas section 399's ban on editorials is completely neutral, disal-
lowing statements of opinion regardless of what that opinion may
be.9
0
The Court's second major argument appears more logical.
When the Carnegie Commission first filed its report on public tele-
vision, and Congress patterned the Public Broadcasting Act after
its recommendations, the Act was full of safeguards to prevent di-
rect government interference with public television management.
First, Congress designed the Corporation for Public Broadcasting
to facilitate freedom from government intervention. 1 Second, the
85. Id. at 3119-20.
86. 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
87. "A regulation of speech that is motivated by nothing more than a desire to curtail
expression of a particular point of view on controversial issues of general interest is the
purest example of a 'law . . .abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.' " Id. at 546.
88. Id. at 532.
89. Id.
90. As Justice Stevens points out in his League of Women Voters dissent, Consolidated
addressed the problem of regulations designed to stop particular groups from espousing a
particular point of view-such as the public utilities in Consolidated espousing the pros of
nuclear power. League of Women Voters, 104 S. Ct. at 3137-38. Section 399, on the other
hand, suppresses a certain type of speech-editorials-regardless of their content. Id.
91. The corporation's directors are not government employees, and no more than half
may belong to the same political party. In addition, the corporation may not own or operate
any stations of its own; thus, no station falls under direct federal control. See supra note 19
and accompanying text.
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fairness doctrine applies to both public and private stations that
present controversial programming.9 2 In addition, case law deter-
mined when a station could refuse air time to political candidates.
The most dramatic example of the Supreme Court upholding such
a denial of free speech is CBS v. Democratic National Commit-
tee."3 There, the Supreme Court upheld the FCC's refusal to re-
quire broadcasters to accept all paid political advertisements. The
Red Lion Court held that as long as both sides are represented in
some manner, the first amendment requirement is met.9 4 Finally,
the district court in Accuracy in Media, Inc. v. FCC " held that
the Corporation for Public Broadcasting is not required to make
sure that its stations provide programming that is unbiased and
objective."
Another safeguard in the Act allows Congress to give long-
term appropriations of funds rather than yearly allotments.9 7 This
budgeting technique helps ensure that public stations do not suffer
a loss of funding if they choose to espouse a point of view with
which Congress does not agree.98 In the Court's view, the risk of
such an occurrence is "speculative" at best because Congress would
not refuse funding to hundreds of stations because a handful held
views that were unpopular with legislators.99
The Court suggested that a major threat to Congress comes in
the form of nationally produced and distributed programs, which
could potentially reach a much larger audience than local station
editorials. 00 Yet, section 399 does not contemplate this issue at all
because only local station opinions are forbidden, not station pro-
grams specifically addressing controversial issues.'
92. See supra text accompanying notes 29 and 31.
93. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
94. Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 378 (1969).
95. 521 F.2d 288 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
96. Id. at 297.
97. See supra note 37.
98. See id.
99. League of Women Voters, 104 S. Ct. at 3123.
100. Id. at 3124.
101. The majority ignores the suggestion that perhaps Congress was not concerned with
programs of national scope when it drafted § 399 but was only interested in keeping public
broadcasters from using federal funds to produce and broadcast opinions that legislators or
taxpayers might not favor. Justice Rehnquist, dissenting, stated:
[I]t is entirely rational for Congress to have wished to avoid the appearance of
government sponsorship of a particular view or a particular political candidate.
... Nor has it prevented public stations from airing programs, documentaries,
interviews, etc. dealing with controversial subjects, so long as management itself
does not expressly endorse a particular viewpoint.
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The majority quickly dismissed another government conten-
tion in support of section 399. Because stations retain the freedom
to express opinions through program and interview selection, and
because they choose the format under which news is presented, the
government suggested that section 399 does not deny public sta-
tions freedom of speech. Justice Brennan answered that if that is
true, section 399 does not advance any substantial governmental
interest. 102
The majority's conclusion, however, logically does not follow
the premise. If Congress denied stations the freedom to editorialize
to avoid the possibility of trapping them into situations in which
government dictates their opinions but specifically allowed them
the freedom to state their opinions in ways that could not become
vehicles for government propaganda, then it would seem that sec-
tion 399 provides a solution to a problem of potential magnitude.
Public broadcasters, under section 399, need not worry about tai-
loring their opinions to those of local, state, or federal government
officials; they simply may not present those opinions in editorial
form.
The government's final argument was that Congress's spend-
ing power provides the authority for section 399. In Regan v. Tax-
ation With Representation0 3 (TWR), the Supreme Court inter-
preted sections 501(c)(3) and 501(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue
Code to allow organizations seeking to engage in lobbying to estab-
lish separate affiliates for nonlobbying and lobbying activities and
still claim a tax exemption for both under the respective provi-
sions. 104 Taxation With Representation is an organization that pro-
motes its view of the "public interest" on matters involving federal
taxation. It attempted to take tax exempt status under section
501(c)(3) because the corporation was formed by combining a sec-
tion 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organization with a section 501(c)(4) tax-
exempt company. Internal Revenue Service denied the exemption
because it appeared that a substantial part of the corporation's ac-
tivities would involve influencing legislation, a factor that rendered
Id. at 3129, 3132 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 3126.
103. 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
104. Id. at 544. In TWR, however, the corporation was able to split its functions in two
parts, forming lobbying affiliates and nonlobbying affiliates. In League of Women Voters, all
Justices are in agreement that the facts are substantially different-a station receiving even
1% of its funding from the Corporation for Public Broadcasting is completely barred from
editorializing. League of Women Voters, 104 S. Ct. at 3128.
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it ineligible for tax-exempt status under section 501(c)(3).'05
Using TWR as a model, Justice Brennan suggested that a re-
vised form of section 399, permitting noncommercial stations to es-
tablish "affiliate" organizations responsible for all editorial func-
tions, would meet the Court's approval.106 Because the Court has
no authority to revise section 399, however, the majority declared
that TWR was not binding.1
0 7
Justice Rehnquist took a different view in dissent. He stated
that although the right to lobby is constitutional, the Court re-
jected the "contention that Congress' decision not to subsidize lob-
bying violates the First Amendment."' 0 8 The Justice equated the
situation in TWR with the League of Women Voters dilemma: be-
cause Congress subsidized these public broadcasters, they also
would subsidize their editorial activities.
IV. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF League of Women Voters
FCC v. League of Women Voters gives public broadcasters the
power to editorialize on any issue. But what have broadcasters re-
ally gained? Prior to this decision, any noncommercial public
broadcaster could express its opinions through selection of pro-
grams, presentation of news items, and presentation of editorials
by individuals. As a result of League of Women Voters, a broad-
caster may state that its editorials represent the opinion of the
management, and it must provide equal reply time to any group or
individual who disagrees. This lends validity to the majority's
statement that section 399 appears to merely limit free speech
without providing any benefit. Yet, Justice Stevens's opening re-
mark in his dissenting opinion, which suggested that psychological
propagandizing exists everywhere, is equally plausible."0 '
105. TWR, 461 U.S. at 541-42.
106. League of Women Voters, 104 S. Ct. at 3128.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 3129, 3131 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Rehnquist also pointed out that the
TWR majority held that strict judicial scrutiny is not necessary when Congress chooses to
"subsidize some speech but not other speech," because this is a valid use of Congress's
spending power. Id. at 3131.
109. The court jester who mocks the King must choose his words with great care.
• . . The child who wants a new toy does not preface his request with a comment
on how fat his mother is.. . . Elected officials may remember how their elections
were financed. By enacting the statutory provision that the Court invalidates
today, a sophisticated group of legislators expressed a concern about the poten-
tial impact of government funds on pervasive and powerful organs of mass
communication.
Id. at 3133 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Although public broadcasters may have achieved a limited vic-
tory, one of the plaintiffs in League of Women Voters, and the
class he represented, did gain something of substance. Henry Wax-
man personified the group that uses public broadcasting, and this
group of individuals has gained the right to hear the opinions of
public broadcasters, uninfluenced by commercial advertisers. Per-
haps Justice Brennan saw this as the ultimate achievement-one
worth the creative reasoning he used to ensure a majority agreed
with him.
The Court succeeded in writing a mildly liberal opinion in
favor of first amendment rights, but in doing so, it has attempted
to limit Congress's spending power. In addition, Justice Brennan
seemed obsessed with suggesting ways in which Congress could res-
urrect section 399, rather than destroy it.
Unfortunately, the most obvious point of dissension among
the majority, and between Justices Rehnquist and Stevens, was a
question that will always yield valid arguments both ways. Free-
dom of speech has been a vital part of American philosophy since
the Revolution, but the fear of the government disseminating
propaganda through the media is the stuff of political nightmares.
Just how much restraint section 399 placed on educational broad-
casters remains to be seen. Given the Court's liberal use of sugges-
tions on how to take the sting out of the editorial ban while still
allowing Congress to retain some control over its purse strings, it
seems likely that future legislation is forthcoming and that the
viewing public has not seen the last of section 399.110
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110. Congress's most likely course of action will be to utilize one of the suggestions
made in the majority opinion. A disclaimer requirement could accomplish the same goal as §
399. Brennan suggested that if all public station managements would broadcast a disclaimer
stating that editorial views do not reflect those of the government, then they could voice any
opinion without congressional retaliation. League of Women Voters, 104 S. Ct. at 3125. This
could merely circumvent the problem, however, if public broadcasters fear that disapproving
congressmen would cut funding regardless of whose opinions were aired. Congress, if it is to
rewrite § 399, must choose its words carefully.
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